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MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES ARE ROUTINELY DENIED THE




In a globalized world, it is no surprise that human mobility is on the rise. The
number of international migrants' increased from approximately 173 million in
20002 to 214 million in 20103 and stood at 244 million in 2015.4 This includes over
65 million forcibly displaced persons and more than 21 million refugees.' In
addition, although not a focus of this comment, 10 million stateless people6 and 40
million internally displaced persons7 also suffer varying deprivations of human
rights.
While more migrants and refugees are on the move, they increasingly suffer
from serious violations of their basic human rights en route, at the borders, and in
the countries of transit as well as destination countries. This article discusses the
challenges migrants and refugees face as they seek protection and the several recent
efforts to find solutions to their plight. In Part II, I review the nature, magnitude, and
complexity of the current international movement of migrants and refugees. Part III
* John Evans University Professor, University of Denver; Thompson Marsh Professor of International
Law and Director of the Ved Nanda Center for International & Comparative Law, University of Denver
Sturm College of Law
1. There is no universal or legal definition of a migrant In common usage, an international
migrant is a person who is outside the state of which he or she is a national or citizen and if a stateless
person, he or she is outside the state of birth or habitual residence.
2. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, 1
8, U.N. Doc. A/71/40767 (July 20, 2016) [hereinafter Special Rapporteur's July 20, 2016 Report],
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/SRMigrants/DevelopingGlobalCompactOnMigration.pdf;
U.N. Secretary-General, In safety and dignity: addressing large movements of refugees and migrants, 1
12, U.N. Doc. A/70/59 (Apr. 21, 2016), http://www.undocs.org/A/70/59.
3. U.N., Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights [OHCHR], Migration: a global
governance issue (Nov. 9, 2010),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/MigrationGlobalGovernancelssue.aspx.
4. G.A. Res. 71/1, 1 3 (Oct. 3, 2016) [hereinafter N.Y. Declaration], http://www.unhcr.org/en-
us/57e39d987.
5. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], Figures at a Glance (2015),
http://www.unher.org/en-us/figures-at-a-glance.html (I will often use the term migrants to include
refugees. A refugee is officially defined under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,
infra note 180 and accompanying text).
6. Id.
7. UNHCR, Internally Displaced People, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/intemally-displaced-
people.html.
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discusses the challenges migrants face and recent efforts undertaken to protect their
rights and find a more orderly, predictable, coordinated, and humane process to
address these challenges, contrasted with the current unregulated and ad hoc
approaches. Part IV presents the recent developments related to refugee admissions
in the United States. Part V notes the applicable international law, including the
international law of migrants and international refugee law. Part VI provides
analysis, followed by conclusion in Part VII.
II. NATURE, MAGNITUDE, AND COMPLEXITY OF THE MIGRATION CRISIS
On September 19, 2016, the United Nations General Assembly aptly stated the
reasons for voluntary movement and forced displacement:
Some people move in search of new economic opportunities and
horizons. Others move to escape armed conflict, poverty, food insecurity,
persecution, terrorism, or human rights violations and abuses. Still others
do so in response to the adverse effects of climate change.. or other
environmental factors. Many move, indeed, for a combination of these
reasons.8
Among the major pull factors is that destination states need migrant labor.
The number of displaced persons is indeed staggering and has grown
dramatically, partially due to the continuing Syrian conflict, and also because of
ethnic and religious tensions in several countries including Afghanistan, Eritrea,
Iraq, Libya, and Somalia. More than a million refugees (those who flee across
international borders because of war, violence, and persecution) and migrants
crossed the Mediterranean in 2015, seeking safety,' and the number of those who
applied for asylum in Europe between July 2015 and May 2016, also stood at more
than one million.' 0
The numbers of unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in Europe are on the
rise, as well - 198,500 entered Europe between 2008 and 2015, and 48 percent
arrived in 2015 alone." UNICEF has stated in a recent report, Hitting Rock Bottom:
How 2016 Became the Worst Year for Syria's Children, that Syria's children have
suffered the most during their country's civil war, for, as, in 2016 at least 652
children were killed, 850 were recruited and used in the conflict; more than 1.7
million inside Syria are out of school, and nearly six million were dependent on
humanitarian assistance.'2 The number of Syrian children living as refugees in
Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and Iraq is over 2.3 million.' 3 The report adds,
8. N.Y. Declaration, supra note 4, 1 1.
9. UNHCR, Better Protecting Refugees in the EU and Globally, at 2 (2016),
http://www.refworld.org/docid/58385d4e4.html [hereinafter Better Protecting Refugees].
10. Phillip Connor & Jens Manuel Krogstad, Key facts about the world's refugees (PEw RESEARCH
CENTER Oct. 5, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/10/05/key-facts-about-the-worlds-
refugees/.
11. Id
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"[s]ince the beginning of the conflict in 2011, thousands of children crossed Syria's
borders unaccompanied or separated from their families. The situation of more than
47,000 people stranded at the no man's land near Syria's southeastern border with
Jordan continues to deteriorate. "14
The number of migrant arrivals to Europe by sea has slowed, due to the
increased border restrictions on refugee and migrant movements toward and within
Europe in 2016, and Turkey's decision to end the irregular migration from Turkey
to the European Union, as set out in the EU-Turkey statement of March 16, 2016."
Nevertheless, during the first 73 days of 2017, 19,653 migrants, including refugees,
still arrived in Europe."
The perilous journeys resulted in the deaths of 7,763 migrants worldwide in
2016, an increase of 27 percent compared to 2015 and 47 percent compared to 2014;
5,085 of them died in the Mediterranean Sea in 2016, an increase of 34 percent from
2015."1 Despite increased search-and-rescue efforts, 788 migrants, including
refugees, died during the first 71 days of 2017.18
The recognition of the variety of reasons for the movement of people mentioned
above was in a resolution the General Assembly adopted on September 19, 2016,
entitled the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (Declaration);1 this
was the outcome document of the High-Level Plenary Meeting on addressing large
movements of refugees and migrants. The Heads of State and Government and High
Representatives had assembled to address this topic. Earlier, in March 2016, a
regional process in the Asia-Pacific Region, the Bali Process on People Smuggling,
Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime, had charted a
comprehensive regional approach to managing migration flows and combating
people smuggling and human trafficking.20
A day following the UN Summit, President Barack Obama opened the Leaders'
14. Id.
15. European Commission Press Release 144/16, Council of the European Union, EU-Turkey
statement (Mar. 18, 2016), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18-eu-
turkey-statement/.
16. International Organization for Migration [IOM], Mediterranean migrant arrivals reach 19,653,
Deaths: 525, MISSING MIGRANTS PROJECT (Mar. 14, 2017),
https://missingmigrants.iom.int/mediterranean-migrant-arrivals-reach-19653-deaths-525 [hereinafter
Missing Migrants].
17. Migrant Deaths and Disappearances Worldwide: 2016 Analysis (IOM Mar. 17, 2017),
www.iom.int/news/migrant-deaths-and-disappearances-worldwide-2016-analysis.
18. Missing Migrants, supra note 16; see, e.g., Declan Walsh, Libyans Find Bodies of 74 Migrants
on Coast, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2017, at A4 (from a shipwrecked inflatable raft boat found on the shore);
Ben Hubbard & Shuaib Almosawa, Somali Migrants' Trek Becomes Scene of Horror, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar.
18, 2017, at A7 (killed by firing from a military helicopter on their boat).
19. N.Y. Declaration, supra note 4.
20. Sixth Ministerial Conference of the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons
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Summit on Refugees,21 at which donors increased the financial contributions made
earlier to the United Nations and other international humanitarian organizations by
approximately $4.5 billion over the 2015 level.22
As part of the Declaration, the Member States reaffirmed that they would "fully
protect the human rights of all refugees and migrants, regardless of status; all are
rights holders."23 They added that their response would "demonstrate full respect for
international law and international human rights law and, where applicable,
international refugee law and international humanitarian law." 24
Among other commitments, the world leaders stated that hey would recognize
and... address, in accordance with our obligations under international law, the
special needs of all people in vulnerable situations who are traveling within large
movements of refugees and migrants, including women at risk, children, especially
those who are unaccompanied or separated from their families, members of ethnic
and religious minorities, victims of violence, older persons, persons with disabilities,
persons who are discriminated against on any basis, indigenous peoples, victims of
human trafficking, and victims of exploitation and abuse in the context of the
smuggling of migrants.25
Member States also committed to take measures to improve the integration and
inclusion of migrants and refugees, as appropriate, with particular reference to
access to justice.2 They also "committed to implementing border control procedures
in conformity with applicable obligations under international law, including
international human rights law and international refugee law." 27 In addition, they
stated that they would "protect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all
refugee and migrant children, regardless of their status," and, referring to Article
3(1) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, they would "giv[e] primary
consideration at all times to the best interest of the child." 28
Member States plan to adopt a global compact for safe, orderly, and regular
migration and present it at an inter-governmental conference to be held in 2018.29
They also plan to develop a comprehensive refugee response framework through the
process of state negotiations and based on the principles of international cooperation
and on the sharing of the burdens and responsibilities of refugees more equitably,
21. U.N. Summit for Refugees and Migrants 2016 (Sept. 19, 2016),
http://refugeesmigrants.un.org/summit; U.S. Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet on the Leaders'
Summit on Refugees (Sept. 20, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2016/09/20/fact-sheet-leaders-summit-refugees.
22. Id; see also Ved Nanda, The world's refugee system is broken, and solutions are elusive, THE
DENVER POST (Sept. 29, 2016), http://www.denverpost.com/2016/09/29/the-worlds-refugee-system-is-
broken-and-solutions-are-elusive/.






29. Id at Annex II in 1, 9.
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and which will be elaborated by UNHCR.30
Along with these undertakings, the Declaration includes many more
commitments by Member States. Human Rights groups have been critical of the
Declaration, as will be evaluated later in this article. It should, however, be noted
here that notwithstanding these glowing promises, state practices do not match those
commitments.
III. CHALLENGES OF MIGRATION AND RECENT EFFORTS TO PROTECT
MIGRANTS' HUMAN RIGHTS
Migrants increasingly face restrictive immigration policies by states, such as
restricting the inflow of migrants and "push-backs" at land and sea as border control
measures, interception practices, detention, and even deportation. Two recent
examples are the detention law in Hungary and deportation law in Belgium. On
March 7, 2017, the Hungarian Parliament adopted a new law calling for mandatory
detention of all asylum seekers, including children, for the entire length of the
asylum procedure." In a press briefing, the UNHCR spokesperson expressed deep
concern that the asylum seekers "will be detained in shipping containers surrounded
by high razor wire fence at the border for extended periods of time."3 2 It should be
noted that Hungary had already enacted legislative and policy obstacles in addition
to the physical barriers it had erected, which had made it nearly impossible for
asylum seekers to enter the country and apply for asylum. The spokesperson
reminded Hungary that there are only a limited number of grounds to justify
detention of refugees and asylum seekers and it must be "necessary, reasonable and
proportionate" to do so. She reminded Hungary that failure to consider alternatives
to detention could render detention arbitrary. Children, she said, should never be
detained, for detention is never in a child's best interest.33
Under the law passed by Belgium's Parliament, the government is given
extraordinary powers to deport legal residents of foreign origin, of whom there are
about 1.3 million; 34 however, the law excludes Belgian nationals and refugees.
Under the law, foreigners legally resident in Belgium could be deported on the mere
suspicion of engaging in terrorist activities, or for "presenting a risk to public order
or national security." Such action may be taken without a criminal conviction or
even involving a judge. Several human rights groups protested this new law in a
letter and the Belgian Human Rights League is planning to appeal. The fear of
terrorism has already led several European countries - Hungary, Austria, and The
Netherlands - to lower their threshold for deportation in recent years.35
30. Id. at Annex I.





34. Milan Schreuer, Rights Groups See Red Flag in Belgian Deportation Law, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
12, 2017, at A9.
35. Id.
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The Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants has described the
migrants' plight in his report of July 26, 2016: "Unregulated migration in host
countries has led to rising anti-migration sentiment, discrimination and violence, as
migrants are portrayed as 'stealing' jobs and draining social services."3 6 He notes
that the rise of nationalist populist parties and the tragic terrorist attacks around the
world, xenophobia and hate speech have increased, creating a significant trend in
the negative perceptions of migrants, as well creating a stumbling block in the
development of more efficient evidence-based and human rights-based policies.
37
The Special Rapporteur asserts that these negative perceptions persist
notwithstanding immigrants' positive overall impact on employment generation and
investment.38 Referring to an OECD study39 and another study by the OHCHR,40 he
states that migrants contribute to economic growth in the places they go and they
contribute more in direct and indirect taxes than they take out.
4 1
Migrants facing special challenges are those considered "irregular" migrants42
and migrants in a vulnerable situation; children, especially those unaccompanied or
separate from their families; and women and girls migrant workers. Although there
is no universally accepted definition of the term, "irregular migrants," it usually
refers "to the movement of international migrants who enter or stay in a country
without correct authorization."43  They are also usually described as
"undocumented," "unauthorized," "unlawful," and even "illegal.""
According to the Global Migration Group, which is composed of 21 UN and
other international entities working on migration, an "irregular migrant" is "every
person who, owing to undocumented entry or the expiry or his or her visa, lacks
legal status in a transit in a host country. The term applies to migrants who infringe
a country's admission rules and any other person not authorized to remain in the host
country."45
36. Special Rapporteur's July 20, 2016 Report, supra note 2, 1 18.
37. Id
38. Id 1 19.
39. OECD, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION OUTLOOK 2013 (OECD, 2013), http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/intemational-migration-outlook-2013_migroutlook-2013-
en. See also OECD, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION OUTLOOK 2016 (OECD, 2016), http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/international-migration-outlook-2016_migr outlook-2016-en
(analyzing the economic impact of migration and how the OECD countries should respond).
40. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM'R OF HUMAN RIGHTS, THE ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL
RIGHTS OF MIGRANTS IN AN IRREGULAR SITUATION, at 4, U.N. Sales No. E.14.XIV.4 (2014),
http://www.OHCHR.org/documents/Publications/HR-PUB-14-l_en.pdf [hereinafter 2014 OHCHR
Report].
41. Special Rapporteur's July 20, 2016 Report, supra note 2, 1 19.
42. 2014 OHCHR Report, supra note 40, at 4.
43. Id
44. Id.
45. Glob. Migration Grp., International Migration and Human Rights: Challenges and
Opportunities on the Threshold of the 60th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
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In the latest draft, in February 2017, OHCHR and the Global Migration Group
provided a set of principles and guidelines on the human rights protection of
migrants in vulnerable situations.' They state that the concept of a "migrant in a
vulnerable situation" is to be understood as a range of the following intersecting
factors which can exist simultaneously: a vulnerable situation arising from the
reasons for leaving countries of origin; occurring in the context of the circumstances
migrants encounter en route, at borders, and at reception; or related to a specific
aspect of a person's identity or circumstance.7
It was no surprise that the rise in migration numbers led to greater national,
regional, and international attention. International entities have, however, been
actively involved with international migration issues for several decades. These
include the United Nations and its various agencies, especially the Office of the UN
High Commissioner for Human Rights,48 the Special Rapporteur on the Human
Rights of Migrants,49 and the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All
Migrant Workers and Members of their Families."o Two special initiatives by the
UN are the Global Forum on Migration and Development, a "voluntary, informal,
non-binding and government-led process open to all States Members and Observers
of the United Nations, to advance understanding and cooperation on the mutually
reinforcing relationship between migration and development and to foster practical
and action-oriented outcomes,"' and the Global Migration Group, an UN inter-
agency group currently comprising 21 entities, which was established by the
Secretary-General in 2006, and which promotes the wider application of all pertinent
norms relating to migration and encourages "the adoption of more coherent,
comprehensive and better coordinated approaches to the issue of international
migration."52 Other organizations include the International Organization for
Migration, which has now become a related organization to the United Nations,3
and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.54
The major refugee organization is the United Nations Office of the High
46. Office of the High Comm'r of Human Rights & Glob. Migration Grp., Principles and
Guidelines, supported by practical guidance, on the human rights protection of migrants in vulnerable
situations, Draft (Feb. 2017),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Migration/Pages/Draftsforcomments.aspx.
47. Id. at4-5.
48. U.N., Office of the High Comm'n for Human Rights,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Pages/WelcomePage.aspx (last visited Apr. 23, 2017).
49. U.N., Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on the Human
Rights of Migrants, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/migration/rapporteur (last visited Apr. 23,
2017).
50. U.N., Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, Comm. on Migrant Workers,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CMW/Pages/CMWIndex.aspx.
51. Glob. Forum on Migration and Dev., Background and Objectives,
http://gfmd.org/process/background.
52. U.N., Glob. Migration Grp., http://www.globalmigrationgroup.org/.
53. INT'L ORG. ON MIGRATION, http://www.iom.int; Int'l Org. on Migration, IOM Becomes a
Related Organization to the UN (Jul. 25, 2016), https://www.iom.int/news/iom-becomes-related-
organization-un.
54. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV. [OECD], http://www.oecd.org.
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Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Refugee Agency "dedicated to
saving lives, protecting rights and building a better future for refugees, forcibly
displaced communities and stateless people."55 Among the non-governmental
organizations in the United States on migration, major actors include the Migration
Policy Institute,56 and the Population Reference Bureau.5 ' The International Rescue
Committee," U.S. Committee for RefugeeS,59 Refugee Council USA,60 and
Refugees International6 1 are among the major US NGOs active on refugee issues.
In 2015, European countries struggled to cope with the influx of migrants.
Furious efforts were made to stem the tide of migrants entering Europe. These
include the Valletta (Malta) Summit on Migration in November 2015,62 which
brought together European and African heads of state and government and was
designed to build upon the earlier successes of the Rabat and Khartoum processes
on migration, and the EU-Africa Dialogue on Migration and Mobility so as to
address the new challenges of migration and to strengthen cooperation. The outcome
was a Political Declaration6 3 and a Plan of Action.M After committing "to respond
decisively and together manage migration flows... guided by the principles of
solidarity, partnership and shared responsibility," to respect international obligations
and human rights, to make joint efforts against irregular migration, and for
"preventing and fighting migrant smuggling, [and] eradicating trafficking in human
beings,"65 the participants agreed an Action Plan with five identified priority areas:
1. Development benefits of migration and addressing root causes of irregular
migration and forced displacement;
2. Legal migration and mobility;
3. Protection and asylum;
4. Prevention of and fight against irregular migration, migrant smuggling and
trafficking in human beings; and
5. Return, readmission and reintegration.66
To ensure implementation of the Plan, the participants agreed to launch 16
ambitious initiatives, several under each priority area, by the end of 2016.67
In March 2016, European leaders entered into an agreement with Turkey, under
55. U.N. Office of the High Comm'r for Refugees, About, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/about-
us.html.
56. MIGRATION POLICY INST., http://www.migrationpolicy.org.
57. POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU, http://www.prb.org.
58. INT'L RESCUE COMM., https://www.rescue.org/topic/refugees-america.
59. U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES, http://refugees.org.
60. REFUGEE COUNCIL USA, http://www.rcusa.org/.
61. REFUGEES INT'L, https://www.refugeesinternational.org.
62. VALLETTA SUMMIT ON MIGRATION, www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-
summit/2015/11/11-12/.
63. Valletta Summit on Migration, Political Declaration (Nov. I1-12, 2015).
64. Valletta Summit on Migration, Action Plan (Nov. I 1-12, 2015).
65. Valletta Summit, supra note 63, at 1, 3.
66. Valletta Summit Action Plan, supra note 64.
67. Id. at 1.
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which Turkey will accept the return of all migrants crossing from Turkey to Greece
who do not need international protection and all irregular migrants intercepted in
Turkish waters." The EU agreed to provide financial assistance to Turkey as part
of the deal. Both countries also agreed to strengthen measures against migrant
smugglers.69 The accord sharply reduced crossings into Greece.
As the EU-Turkey agreement was considered a great success, the EU
introduced in 2016 a New Migration Partnership Framework (MPF) aimed at fully
integrating migration in the its foreign policy, with the stated objective of "saving
lives and breaking the business model of smugglers, preventing illegal migration and
enhanc[ing] cooperation on returns and readmission of irregular migrants, as well as
stepping up investments in partner countries."0 Long-term measures of the New
MPF include addressing the root causes of irregular migration and forced
displacement by supporting partner countries' political, social and economic
development, and improving opportunities for sustainable development." To
implement it, the EU and member countries would strengthen the existing EU
Emergency Trust Fund for Africa and provide eight billion euros over the period
2016-2020.72
Nearly four months after the launching of the MPF, the Commission presented
the first progress report, stating that "the collective work is starting to bear fruit and
is resulting in tangible outcomes."73 The first group of countries in Africa part of
this partnership were Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal, and Jordan and
Lebanon in the Near East.74 Similar cooperation agreements are likely to follow
with other countries.
Subsequently, EU heads of state or government met on February 3, 2017,"7 and
agreed on measures aimed at reducing the flow of irregular migrants from Libya to
Italy, whose numbers had reached 181,000 in 2016.76 The outcome of the meeting,
the Malta Declaration,7 7 states that "[a] key element of a sustainable migration policy
is to ensure effective control of our external border and stem illegal flows into the
EU." 7 It further states that "[t]he Partnership Framework and the Valletta Action
68. European Council Press Release 144/16, EU-Turkey statement (Mar. 18, 2016),
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18-eu-turkey-statement/.
69. Id.
70. European Comm'n, Migration Partnership Framework: A New Approach to Better Manage






74. Better Protecting Refugees, supra note 9, at 4.
75. European Council, Informal Meeting ofEU Heads ofState or Government, Malta, 03/02/2017,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2017/02/03-informal-meeting/.
76. Id. at 4.
77. European Council Press Release, Malta Declaration by the Members of the European Council
on the External Aspects of Migration: Addressing the Central Mediterranean Route (Feb. 3, 2017).
78. Id. 12.
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Plan have allowed us to deepen long-term cooperation with a number of partner
countries, including on root causes of migration, through a solid partnership based
on mutual trust. This work is already yielding results and will be intensified.""9
Acknowledging that "[e]fforts to stabilize Libya are now more important than ever,
and the EU will do its utmost to contribute to that objective," the EU leaders decided
on several priorities aimed at strengthening capacity-building efforts80 and allocating
resources to address those priorities.'
To take stock of the progress made under the joint Valletta Action Plan and
Declaration, Senior Officials met in Malta on February 8-9, 2017.82 Delegations
from Africa and Europe participated and the meeting adopted a set of joint
conclusions reiterating their commitment to the principles of "solidarity,
partnership, and shared responsibility" in the areas of mobility and migration
management." Recognizing the benefits of well-managed migration to countries of
origin, transit and destination, they reiterated their commitment to pursue the aims
of the Valletta Action Plan, which requires cooperation, coordination, and
partnership among all stakeholders.84
Among the key messages, the participants called for addressing the root causes
of migration 5 and efforts to promote legal migration.86 They also recognized the
need to strengthen international protection,8 7 and for "a stronger focus on measures
aimed at fighting trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling, as well as
implementing integrated border management and cross-border cooperation.8 8
In a statement at the Senior Officials' meeting, the Director of the Europe
Bureau on behalf of UNHCR, Vincent Cochetel, stressed the need to provide
differentiated responses between refugees and asylum seekers, who cannot return to
their home countries, and migrants.89 He warned against the potential risk of a
fragmented approach to the funding for activities carried out under the joint Valletta
Action Plan and the Declaration because several bilateral actions and projects by EU
Member States since the Valletta Summit were not coordinated with the EU funded
programs and projects under the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa. Thus, he called
for "comprehensive, integrated and better coordinated approaches across all EU
79. Id. 14.
80. Id. 1 6.
81. Id. 17.
82. Senior Officials' Meeting (SOM) held in Malta, on 8 and 9 February 2017, RABAT PROCESS,
https://processus-de-rabat.org/en/rabat-process-in-action/208-senior-officials-meeting-som-valletta-
2.html.
83. Joint Conclusions, Joint Valletta Action Plan, Senior Officials' Meeting (SOM) in Malta 8-9
February 2017 at 1.
84. Id. at 2,14.
85. Id. at3,11.
86. Id. at3,12.
87. Id at 3, T 3.
88. Id at 3,T4.
89. UNHCR, Statement delivered by Vincent Cochetel, Director of Europe Bureau on behalf of
UNHCR, Senior Officials Meeting of the Valletta Summit on Migration 8-9 February 2017 (Feb. 10,
2017), http://www.refworld.org/docid/589dc9e34.html.
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funded actions, including those undertaken bilaterally to ensure maximum
impact."o He underlined the importance of increasing available safe legal pathways
to protection, specifically for refugees.
Mr. Cochetel added:
Despite the direct link between family reunification and successful local
integration, refugees still experience unnecessary hardship n ensuring
that their families can join them. Resettlement quotas remain limited,
almost virtual. As an example, less than 2,000 refugees have been
resettled from Ethiopia and Sudan to Europe over the last three years.
Labor mobility or overseas educational schemes for refugees from their
region of flight also remain almost inexistent. Combatting the business
models of traffickers will only be truly successful if such legal pathways
for refugees are accessible to them.9 1
With 25,000 unaccompanied and separated children having arrived in Italy, he
called on states to address this challenge through a child protection dialogue and take
decisions based on the best interest of the children, which may be best served by
"family reunion" and reintegration assistance with relatives in their country of origin
and [or] local integration or legal transfers to a third country,"92  rather than
channeling them into asylum or other enforcement-related procedures.
Earlier, in December 2016, the UJNHCR had proposed in a study entitled Better
Protecting Refugees in the EU and Globally,93 a common, principled and pragmatic
approach for the EU to migration and asylum, which builds on the New York
Declaration.94 The study called for a comprehensive EU asylum and refugee policy,
both in its internal and external dimensions, which should have the capacity, to
address and respond to movements of people effectively.95 It elaborated further
under four headings: an EU that 1) is engaged beyond its borders to protect, assist
and find solutions by developing sustainable asylum systems;96 2) is prepared to
respond to possible future arrivals in significant numbers;97 3) protects through a
well-managed common asylum system that ensures access to territory;98 and 4)
integrates refugees in their communities."
The effectiveness of the EU's MPF initiative, which is debatable, will be
evaluated in part VI.
Long before the mass migration crisis caused by the large-scale and




93. Better Protecting Refugees, supra note 9.
94. Id at 2; N.Y. Declaration, supra note 4.
95. Better Protecting Refugees, supra note 9, at 2.
96. Id at 4.
97. Id. at 8.
98. Id. at 10.
99. Id. at 19.
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European Asylum System.'" After the adoption of several legislative measures
harmonizing common minimum standards over the years, and several reforms,'01 in
May and July 2016, the European Commission presented proposals for another
major reform "based on common rules, a fairer sharing of responsibility, and safe
legal channels for those who need protection to get it in the EU."1 0 2 The Commission
stated that the reform
establishes a fully efficient, fair and humane asylum policy which
functions effectively both in times of normal and in times of high
migratory pressure. It ensures a fair allocation of asylum applications
among Member States and provides for a common set of rules at EU level
to simplify and shorten the asylum procedures, discourage secondary
movements and increase the prospect of integration.1
03
The European Commission describes the main legislation on asylum in the EU:
Asylum Procedures Directive: establishes common standards of
safeguards and guarantees to access a fair and efficient asylum procedure.
Reception Conditions Directive: establishes minimum common standards
of living conditions for asylum applicants; ensures that applicants have
access to housing, food, employment and health care.
Qualification Directive: establishes common grounds for granting
international protection and foresees a series of rights for its beneficiaries
(residence permits, travel documents, access to employment and
education, social welfare and healthcare).
Dublin Regulation: determines which Member State is responsible for
examining a given asylum application.
EURODAC Regulation: establishes an EU asylum fingerprint database.
When someone applies for asylum, no matter where in the EU, their
fingerprints are transmitted to the EURODAC central system. '
It is noteworthy that under the Dublin Mechanism, the responsible Member
State is usually the state through which the asylum seeker first entered the EU, and
thus the responsibility is primarily left to the Member States located at the external
borders of the EU. As Greece was overwhelmed with the migrants crossing to its
shores from Turkey and the responsibility was not shared, especially by the Northern
European countries, the Dublin regime has seemingly failed. In Part VI, I will
elaborate further.
100. Common European Asylum System, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (June 12, 2016),
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum en.
101. Id.
102. The Common European Asylum System (CEAS), EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-
migration/background-
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IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS RELATED TO REFUGEE ADMISSIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES
The movement of refugees and migrants has recently become a major, central
area of contention in the United States, beyond its usual place as merely important.
Within the first three months of its existence, the new Trump administration ordered
an abrupt halt to the processing of refugees and asylum-seekers. The expressed
intention was to avert potential terrorist attacks within the US. This Order was
promptly rebuffed by the courts. The Trump administration then scaled back its
Order, and was again rebuffed. At issue was the motivating intent of the action and
its justifiability under the US Constitution and international refugee regimes.
During his presidential election campaign, Donald Trump voiced the anxiety
of many Americans over refugees entering America from predominantly Muslim
countries. Accordingly, within a week following his inauguration as President,
Trump announced a ban on refugees or migrants from Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia,
Sudan, Syria, and Yemen.05
Executive Order 13769 of January 27, 2017,106 entitled Protecting the Nation
105. Executive Order 13769, Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United
States, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2017/01/27/executive-order-protecting-nation-foreign-terrorist-entry-united-states [hereinafter
EO- I].
106. Id. In the parts relevant o this article, the Order provides:
Sec. 2. Policy. It is the policy ofthe United States to protect its citizens from foreign nationals
who intend to commit terrorist attacks in the United States; and to prevent the admission of
foreign nationals who intend to exploit United States immigration laws for malevolent
purposes.
Sec. 3. ... (c) To temporarily reduce investigative burdens on relevant agencies during the
review period described in subsection (a) of this section, to ensure the proper review and
maximum utilization of available resources for the screening of foreign nationals, and to ensure
that adequate standards are established to prevent infiltration by foreign terrorists or criminals,
pursuant to section 212(f) ofthe INA, 8 U.S.C. § 182(f), I hereby proclaim that the immigrant
and nonimmigrant entry into the United States of aliens from countries referred to in section
217(a)(12) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § II 87(a)(12), would be detrimental to the interests of the
United States, and I hereby suspend entry into the United States, as immigrants and
nonimmigrants, of such persons for 90 days from the date of this order (excluding those foreign
nationals traveling on diplomatic visas, North Atlantic Treaty Organization visas, C-2 visas
for travel to the United Nations, and G-1, G-2, G-3, and G4 visas).
Sec. 5. Realignment of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program for Fiscal Year 2017. (a) The
Secretary of State shall suspend the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) for 120
days. During the 120-day period, the Secretary of State, in conjunction with the Secretary of
Homeland Security and in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, shall review
the USRAP application and adjudication process to determine what additional procedures
should be taken to ensure that those approved for refugee admission do not pose a threat to the
security and welfare of the United States, and shall implement such additional
procedures. Refugee applicants who are already in the USRAP process may be admitted upon
the initiation and completion ofthese revised procedures. Upon the date that is 120 days after
the date of this order, the Secretary of State shall resume USRAP admissions only for nationals
of countries for which the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the
Director of National Intelligence have jointly determined that such additional procedures are
316 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y VOL. 45:3
from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States, reduced to less than half the
number of refugees who would be accepted into the US and suspended for four
months processing of refugees under the US Refugee Admissions Program.o7
Under this program, refugees and asylum seekers are generally processed into the
country under recognized criteria and are given assistance and opportunities for
settlement. The Order also suspended processing of refugees from Syria until further
notice and suspended entry of persons from countries whose vetting standards do
not meet US requirements.
Executive Order 13769 cited pertinent US law,'o which authorizes the
President to "suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or
nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be
appropriate," if he finds that their entry "would be detrimental to the interests of the
United States." This language from the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 "
was amended by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965,'o which provides,
adequate to ensure the security and welfare of the United States.
(b) Upon the resumption of USRAP admissions, the Secretary of State, in consultation with
the Secretary of Homeland Security, is further directed to make changes, to the extent
permitted by law, to prioritize refugee claims made by individuals on the basis of religious-
based persecution, provided that the religion of the individual is a minority religion in the
individual's country of nationality. Where necessary and appropriate, the Secretaries of State
and Homeland Security shall recommend legislation to the President that would assist with
such prioritization.
(c) Pursuant to section 212(f) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f), I hereby proclaim that the entry
of nationals of Syria as refugees is detrimental to the interests of the United States and thus
suspend any such entry until such time as I have determined that sufficient changes have been
made to the USRAP to ensure that admission of Syrian refugees is consistent with the national
interest.
(e) Notwithstanding the temporary suspension imposed pursuant to subsection (a) of this
section, the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security may jointly determine to admit
individuals to the United States as refugees on a case-by-case basis, in their discretion, but
only so long as they determine that the admission of such individuals as refugees is in the
national interest-including when the person is a religious minority in his country of
nationality facing religious persecution, when admitting the person would enable the United
States to conform its conduct to a preexisting international agreement, or when the person is
already in transit and denying admission would cause undue hardship-and it would not pose
a risk to the security or welfare of the United States.
107. Memorandum for the Secretary of State on the Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2017,
THE WHITE HOUSE; OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY (Sept 28, 2016), ("In accordance with
section 207 of the Immigration and Nationality Act ... (8 U.S.C. § 1157), and after appropriate
consultations with the Congress, I hereby make the following determinations and authorize the
following actions: The admission of up to 110,000 refugees to the United States during Fiscal
Year...2017 is justified by humanitarian concerns or is otherwise in the national
interest; .... "'), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2016/09/28/presidential-determination-refugee-admissions-fiscal-year-2017.
108. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f).
109. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 Pub. L. No. 82414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified at
8 U.S.C. ch. 12).
110. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1968) (codified at
8 U.S.C. ch. 12).
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inter alia: "No person shall receive any preference or priority or be discriminated
against in the issuance of an immigrant visa because of the person's race, sex,
nationality, place of birth, or place of residence.""I
Thus, despite the administration's protestations to the contrary, President
Trump's campaign promises, banning immigration of Muslims and people from
predominantly Muslim countries, were found to evidence the administration's intent
when lawsuits challenging the Executive Order were brought in numerous federal
courts. Those courts thus rejected the administration's argument that he Order was
necessitated only by security concerns.
In nearly 50 lawsuits challenging the Order after it was announced, between
January 28 and January 31, federal courts granted temporary relief, including a
temporary restraining order (TRO) barring enforcement of core elements of the
Order, including its provisions suspending entry for nationals from the seven listed
countries for 90 days and limiting the acceptance of refugees.112 The courts often
highlighted the special priority that had been promised for "certain religious
minorities," as had been stated by President Trump in an interview on the day he
signed the order, that Syrian Christian refugees would be given priority status in the
United States."3
On February 3, District Judge James Robart of the Western District of
Washington at Seattle granted the first TRO in Washington [later joined by
Minnesota] v. Trump."l4 The court stated:
The proper legal standard for preliminary injunctive relief [and temporary
restraining order] requires a party to demonstrate (1) 'that he is likely to
succeed on the merits, (2) that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in
the absence of preliminary relief, (3) that the balance of equities tips in
his favor, and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest.' [Citations
omitted.]"'
In the alternative, Judge Robart noted,
[An injunction is appropriate if "serious questions going to the merits
were raised and the balance of the hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff's
favor," thereby allowing preservation of the status quo when complex
legal questions require further inspection or deliberation, [provided] the
plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that
the injunction is in the public interest. [Citations omitted.]"6
111. 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a).
112. The following section considers a few of the actions.
113. See Glenn Kessler, Trump's Claim that it is 'Very Tough'for Christian Syrians to get to the
United States, WASH. POST: FACT CHECKER (Jan. 28, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2017/01/28/trumps-claim-that-it-is-very-tough-
for-christian-syrians-to-get-to-the-united-states/?utm_term=.el47c7cdlIb4.
114. Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017), appeal dismissed sub
nom. Washington, et al., v. Donald J. Trump, et al., (Feb. 4, 2017).
115. Id. at 3.
116. Id. at 3-4.
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The court found in favor of the plaintiffs, ordered that sections 3(c)i7 and 5(a),
(b), (c), and (e)'" not be enforced, and found further that, under the legislative
imperative that the immigration laws be administered uniformly throughout the
country, this order enjoining enforcement must be effective nationwide and thus
could not be limited to the plaintiff states.'19 The government filed its appeal and an
emergency motion to stay the TRO in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
denied the motion on February 9, 2017.120
On February 14, Judge Leonie Brinkema of Virginia issued a similar ruling,
granting the plaintiffs a preliminary injunction against the travel ban.'21 She found
the Order clearly discriminatory and emphasized its violation of the First
Amendment Establishment Clause.2 2 Looking at the proliferation of evidence
against the ban as showing clear intent to ban Muslims, she stated, inter alia, that
"[i]t is a discriminatory purpose that matters, no matter how inefficient the
execution."l2 3 She ultimately found, "[E]njoining unconstitutional action by the
Executive Branch is always in the public's interest." 24
The administration's appeal in the Ninth Circuit was subsequently voluntarily
dismissed by the administration'25 when it issued Order 13780 (EO-2) on March 6,
2017, similarly entitled Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry into the
United States.126
On March 15, Judge Theodore Chuang of the District of Maryland blocked
section 2(c)127 of the revised order, which purported to ban travel into the US by
citizens from Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen, Iraq having been
exempted from the list in Order 13780.128 And on March 17, Washington's Judge
Robart, in a new case, Ali v. Trump,29 stayed the action allowing the Hawaii ruling
to govern the matter across the country.130
Later in March, some 13 states joined together to support the Trump travel ban.
On March 24, 2017, US District Court Judge Anthony Trenga found that the March
6 travel ban was sufficiently different from the initial one and thus the plaintiffs were
117. EO-1, supra note 105, at § 3(c).
118. Id, §§ 5(a), (b), (c), and (e).
119. Washington v. Trump, supra note 114, at 6.
120. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017), reconsideration en banc denied, No. 17-
35105, (9th Cir. Mar. 15, 2017).
121. Aziz v. Trump, No. 117cv00I 16LMBTCB (E.D. Va., Feb. 13, 2017) [hereinafter Aziz].
122. See Rachel Weiner, Federal judge in Virginia issues strong rebuke of Trump travel ban, WASH.
POST (Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/judge-in-virginia-grants-
preliminary-injunction-against-travel-ban/2017/02/13/a6l64bfe-f255-1 l e6-a9bO-
ecee7ce475fcstory.html?tid=ainl&utm term=.c41f3e0de8eb.
123. Aziz, supra note 121, at 9.
124. Id at 11.
125. Washington v. Trump, No. cv-0141JLR (W.D. Wash. Mar. 8, 2017) dismissed.
126. Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 FR 13209 (Mar. 6, 2017) [hereafter EO-2].
127. Intl. Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, CV TDC-17-0361, (D. Md. Mar. 16, 2017).
128. See EO-2, supra note 126.
129. Ali v. Trump, No. C17-0135JLR (W.D. Wash. Mar. 17,2017).
130. Id.
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"no longer likely... [to] succeed on their claim that the predominate purpose of EO-
2 is to discriminate against Muslims based on their religion and that EO-2 is a pretext
or a sham for that purpose."1 31 He thus denied the TRO requested by the plaintiff.13 2
However, on March 29, Judge Watson of Hawaii granted the plaintiffs' motion
to convert the temporary restraining order he had previously entered to a
Preliminary.Injunction enjoining the enforcement or implementation of sections 213
131. Sarsour v. Trump, Case No. 1: 17cv00120, 12 (E.D. Va., Mar. 24, 2017).
132. Id. at 32.
133. Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 9, 2017),
Sec. 2.(a) The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State and
the Director of National Intelligence, shall conduct a worldwide review to identify whether,
and if so what, additional information will be needed from each foreign country to adjudicate
an application by a national of that country for a visa, admission, or other benefit under the
INA (adjudications) in order to determine that the individual is not a security or public-safety
threat The Secretary of Homeland Security may conclude that certain information is needed
from particular countries even if it is not needed from every country.
(b) The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the
Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the President a report on the results of the
worldwide review described in subsection (a) of this section, including the Secretary of
Homeland Security's determination of the information needed from each country for
adjudications and a list of countries that do not provide adequate information, within 20 days
of the effective date of this order. The Secretary of Homeland Security shall provide a copy
of the report to the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Director of National
Intelligence.
(c) To temporarily reduce investigative burdens on relevant agencies during the review period
described in subsection (a) ofthis section, to ensure the proper review and maximum utilization
of available resources for the screening and vetting of foreign nationals, to ensure that adequate
standards are established to prevent infiltration by foreign terrorists, and in light of the national
security concerns referenced in section I of this order, I hereby proclaim, pursuant to sections
212(f) and 215(a) ofthe INA, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(f) and I185(a), that the unrestricted entry into
the United States of nationals of Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen would be
detrimental to the interests of the United States. I therefore direct that the entry into the United
States of nationals of those six countries be suspended for 90 days from the effective date of
this order, subject to the limitations, waivers, and exceptions set forth in sections 3 and 12 of
this order.
d) Upon submission of the report described in subsection (b) of this section regarding the
information needed from each country for adjudications, the Secretary of State shall request
that all foreign governments that do not supply such information regarding their nationals
begin providing it within 50 days of notification.
(e) After the period described in subsection (d) of this section expires, the Secretary of
Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, shall
submit to the President a list of countries recommended for inclusion in a Presidential
proclamation that would prohibit the entry of appropriate categories of foreign nationals of
countries that have not provided the information requested until they do so or until the
Secretary of Homeland Security certifies that the country has an adequate plan to do so, or has
adequately shared information through other means. The Secretary of State, the Attorney
General, or the Secretary of Homeland Security may also submit to the President the names of
additional countries for which any of them recommends other lawfusl restrictions or limitations
deemed necessary for the security or welfare of the United States.
(f) At any point after the submission of the list described in subsection (e) of this section, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Attorney
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and 6134 of the second Executive Order across the nation.135 He found that the new
Order was indeed a .'sanitize[d]"'l36 version of the prior Executive Order and noted
that the events leading up to the "adoption of the challenged Executive Order are as
General, may submit to the President he names of any additional countries recommended for
similar treatment, as well as the names of any countries that they recommend should be
removed from the scope of a proclamation described in subsection (e) of this section.
(g) The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to the
President a joint report on the progress in implementing this order within 60 days of the
effective date of this order, a second report within 90 days of the effective date of this order, a
third report within 120 days of the effective date of this order, and a fourth report within 150
days of the effective date of this order.")
134. Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 9, 2017),
Sec. 6. Realignment of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program for Fiscal Year 2017. (a) The
Secretary of State shall suspend travel of refugees into the United States under the USRAP,
and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall suspend decisions on applications for refugee
status, for 120 days after the effective date of this order, subject to waivers pursuant to
subsection (c) of this section. During the 120-day period, the Secretary of State, in conjunction
with the Secretary of Homeland Security and in consultation with the Director of National
Intelligence, shall review the USRAP application and adjudication processes to determine
what additional procedures should be used to ensure that individuals seeking admission as
refugees do not pose a threat to the security and welfare of the United States, and shall
implement such additional procedures. The suspension described in this subsection shall not
apply to refugee applicants who, before the effective date of this order, have been formally
scheduled for transit by the Department of State. The Secretary of State shall resume travel of
refugees into the United States under the USRAP 120 days after the effective date of this order,
and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall resume making decisions on applications for
refugee status only for stateless persons and nationals of countries for which the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence have
jointly determined that the additional procedures implemented pursuant to this subsection are
adequate to ensure the security and welfare of the United States.
(b) Pursuant to section 212(f) of the INA, I hereby proclaim that the entry of more than 50,000
refugees in fiscal year 2017 would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, and thus
suspend any entries in excess of that number until such time as I determine that additional
entries would be in the national interest.
(c) Notwithstanding the temporary suspension imposed pursuant to subsection (a) of this
section, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security may jointly determine
to admit individuals to the United States as refugees on a case-by-case basis, in their discretion,
but only so long as they determine that the entry of such individuals as refugees is in the
national interest and does not pose a threat to the security or welfare of the United States,
including in circumstances such as the following: the individual's entry would enable the
United States to conform its conduct to a preexisting international agreement or arrangement,
or the denial of entry would cause undue hardship.
(d) It is the policy of the executive branch that, to the extent permitted by law and as
practicable, State and local jurisdictions be granted a role in the process of determining the
placement or settlement in their jurisdictions of aliens eligible to be admitted to the United
States as refugees. To that end, the Secretary of State shall examine existing law to determine
the extent to which, consistent with applicable law, State and local jurisdictions may have
greater involvement in the process of determining the placement or resettlement of refugees in
their jurisdictions, and shall devise a proposal to lawfully promote such involvement.
135. Hawaii v. Trump, No. 17-00050 (D. Haw., Mar. 29, 2017) (order granting motion to convert
TRO to a preliminary injunction) [hereinafter Watson 2].
136. Id. at 18.
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full of religious animus, invective, and obvious pretext as is the record here, it is no
wonder that the Government urges the Court to altogether ignore that history and
context."'37
Judge Watson declined to stay this ruling or hold it in abeyance should an
appeal of this Order be filed'38 and that next day, March 30, the administration filed
its appeal of Judge Watson's decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.'
While the travel ban saga continued in the courts, the provisions directed at the
US Refugee Admissions Program in Section 6140 violate America's commitments
under international refugee law, which is incorporated in US domestic law. It also
runs afoul of the US commitment under the New York Declaration on Refugees and
Migrants. 141
Experts and advocacy groups took issue with the President's premise that
refugees from the listed countries were especially likely to commit terrorist attacks
within the United States because those groups had been responsible for previous
attacks; this was factually inconsistent with the actual record of such attacks. To
illustrate, terrorism scholar Charles Kurzman of the University of North Carolina
has stated that there had been no terrorist killing in the US by any person who had
emigrated or whose parents had emigrated from the seven listed countries since
September 11, 2001, and that only two of the 9/11 attackers would have been
identified to fall within the restricted countries because of their national origin, and
they had resided in the US for several years.142
Another expert asked:
Had this temporary prohibition been in effect since 9/11, how many lives
would have been saved? Not one. None of the fatalities resulted from
attacks by individuals from the seven countries named in the directive.
The directive also would not have prevented the 9/11 attacks. This is not
an argument for adding to the list of proscribed countries.143
The same conclusion was stated by the Department of Homeland Security
Intelligence and Analysis Unit in an internal report which found that people from
the countries listed in the ban "pose no increased terror isk,"'" and that "country of
137. Id. at 16.
138. Id.
139. Hawaii v. Trump, No. 17-00050 (D. Haw. Mar. 30, 2017) (Notice of Appeal).
140. Exec. Order 13780 § 6, supra note 134.
141. N.Y. Declaration, supra note 4.
142. CHARLES KURZMAN, MUSLIM-AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT WITH VIOLENT EXTREMISM 2,
Triangle Ctr. on Terrorism and Homeland Sec., Uni. of N.C. Chapel Hill. (Jan. 26, 2017).
143. Brian Michael Jenkins, Why a Travel Restriction Won't Stop Terrorism at Home, TiHE RAND
BLOG (Feb. 10, 2017), www.rand.org/blog/2017/02/why-a-travel-restriction-wont-stop-terrorism-at-
home.html.
144. Vivian Salama & Alicia A. Caldwell, AP Exclusive: DHS report disputes threat from banned
nations, THE BIG STORY: ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 24, 2017, 6:36 PM),
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/39fl f8e4ceed4a30a4570f69329 I c866/dhs-intel-report-disputes-threat-
posed-travel-ban-nations.
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citizenship is unlikely to be a reliable indicator of potential terrorist activity." 45
Under Executive Order 13780, the most recent US commitment to admit
110,000 refugees in 2017 has been reduced to 50,000, with a stay of 120 days on
further processing and imposition of numerous further restrictions on their
eligibility, beyond the very stringent vetting process already in place for refugee
admissions. 146
V. APPLICABLE INTERNATIONAL LAW
As human rights apply to all persons, irrespective of their migration status or
their nationality, migrants and members of their families, as well as refugees, enjoy
the protection of international human rights law. Migrants also enjoy international
labor standards and, more specifically, protection under the International
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of
their Families (Migrant Workers Convention), adopted by the UN General Assembly
in 1990. In addition, several International Labor Organization (ILO) instruments
apply to migrants in general, while several apply specifically to migrant workers.
Refugees are specially protected under the current international refugee regime - the
1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol.
Selected applicable instruments are noted here, without elaboration, with the
only exceptions being the Refugee Regime, the 1990 Migrant Workers Convention,
and two ILO Conventions.
A. Selected International Human Rights Instruments
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16,
1966.147
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, Dec. 10, 2008. 148
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966.149
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Dec. 16, 1966.1s0
Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
145. Ron Nixon, People From 7 Travel-Ban Nations Pose No Increased Terror Risk, Report
Says, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/25/us/politics/travel-ban-nations-
terror-risk.html?_r=); see also Eric Tucker, AP Fact Check: No arrests from 7 nations in travel ban?,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 6, 2017), https://apnews.com/cf244d096e084e7a943b45168deafc5f/AP-
FACT-CHECK:-No-arrests-from-7-nations-in-travel-ban?-Nope.
146. EO-2, section 6, supra note 126.
147. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S.
3.
148. G.A. Res. 63/117, Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, (Dec. 10, 2008).
149. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
150. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171.
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Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty, Dec. 15, 1989.'1'
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965.152
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, Dec. 18, 1979.1'5
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, Oct. 6, 1999.154
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, Dec. 1, 1984. "s
Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 18, 2002.156
Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989.s1
Optional Protocol to the Convention on The Rights of the Child on the Sale of
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Women, 6 Oct. 6, 1999, 2131 U.N.T.S. 83.
155. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
Dec. 10, 1984, 85 U.N.T.S. 1465, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3a94.html.
156. Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Jan. 9,2003, A/RES/57/199, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3de6490b9.html.
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International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced
Disappearance, Dec. 20, 2006.63
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1 9 4 8."
Declaration of the High-level Dialogue on International Migration and
Development, 2013.165
B. International Labor Organization Instruments
The 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 66
1) Freedom of Association and the Effective Recognition of the Right to
Collective Bargaining;167
2) Elimination of All Forms of Forced or Compulsory Labor;' 6 8
3) Effective Abolition of Child Labor;'6 9 and
4) Elimination of Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation.170
It should be noted that migrant workers' needs are specially mentioned in the
Declaration's Preamble.
ILO Convention Number 189 - Domestic Workers' Convention, 201 1.171
ILO Convention Number 97 - Migration for Employment Convention
163. International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, Dec.
20, 2006, 2716 U.N.T.S. 48088.
164. G.A. Res. 217 (111) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948) 217 A (III).
165. G.A. Res. 68/4, In 11-12, UN General Assembly, Declaration of the High-level Dialogue on
International Migration and Development (Jan. 21, 2014) (The Declaration recognized "[t]hat women
and girls account for almost half of all international migrants at the global level, and the need to address
the special situation and vulnerability of migrant women and girls by, inter alia, incorporating a gender
perspective into policies and strengthening national laws, institutions and programmes to combat gender-
based violence, including trafficking in persons and discrimination against girls." The General Assembly
emphasized "the need to establish appropriate measures for the protection of women migrant workers in
all sectors, including those involved in domestic work.").
166. ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, ILO (June 18, 1998),
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/-ednorm/--declaration/documents/publication/wcms_
467653.pdf.




168. Forced Labour Convention, No. 29, ILO (June 28, 1930),
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/fp
=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO:12100:Pl2100_INSTRUMENTID:312174:NO.
169. ILO, Freedom ofAssociation and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, supra note
167, 1 2(a).
170. Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation, No. I11,
ILO (June 4, 1958),
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/p-NORMLEXPUB: 121 00:0::NO: 121 00:Pl2100_ILOCODE:Cl
11.
171. Domestic Workers Convention, No. 189, ILO (June 16, 2011),
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(revised), 1949.172
ILO Recommendation Number 86 - Migration for Employment
Recommendation (revised), 1949.173
ILO Convention Number 143 - Migrant Workers' (Supplementary Provisions)
Convention, 1975.174
ILO Recommendation Number 151 - Migrant Workers' Recommendation,
1975.171
C. Migrant Workers Convention176
As a core landmark international human rights treaty, this is the most
comprehensive international treaty on 1) the rights of migrant workers and their
families, 2) migration regulation, and 3) interstate cooperation. The Convention
explicitly states that all fundamental rights articulated in the international bill of
rights and all international human rights instruments apply to all migrant workers.
The Convention's provisions to protect undocumented migrant workers in an
irregular situation are premised on the recognition in the Preamble that such workers
face even more serious human problems than those faced by persons in a regular
situation (documented migrant workers). Also, these migrant workers "are
frequently employed under less favorable conditions of work than other workers." 77
Thus, in Part III (arts. 8-35), all migrant workers and their families, including
undocumented workers, are granted civil and political rights, 78 as well as economic,
social and cultural rights.7 1
D. ILO Convention No. 97 & Recommendation No. 86 and ILO Convention
143
In 1966, the ILO adopted Convention No. 97 and Recommendation No. 86
concerning Migration for Employment (Revised).8 0 Under these instruments, the
172. Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), No. 97, 1LO (June 8, 1949),
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/nonnlex/en/fp=NORMLEXPUB: 121 00:0::NO: 12 100:Pl 2100_ILOCODE:CO
97.
173. Migration for Employment Recommendation (Revised), No. 86, ILO (June 8, 1949),
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO:12100:Pl2100_ILOCODE:RO
86.
174. Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention, No. 143, ILO (June 4, 1975),
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO:12100:Pl2100_ILO_CODE:Cl
43.
175. Migrant Workers Recommendation, No. 151, ILO (June 4, 1975),
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/fp=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO:12100:P12100_ILOCODE:Rl
51.
176. G.A. Res. 45/158, International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of their Families (Dec. 18, 1990); see also Ved P. Nanda, The Protection of the
Rights of Migrant Workers: Unfinished Business, 2 ASIAN & PACIFIC MIGRATION J. 161, 161 (1993).
177. G.A. Res. 45/158, supra note 177, at Annex, Preamble.
178. Id. at pt. III, arts. 8-24.
179. Id. at arts. 25-35.
180. Convention (No. 97) Concerning Migration for Employment (Revised 1949) art. 6, ¶ 1, July 1,
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principle of equal treatment was further elaborated. Subsequently, in 1975, the ILO
adopted Convention No. 143, concerning Migration in Abusive Conditions and the
Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers
(Supplementary Provisions)."' In Part I, this Convention obligates each State Party
to respect the "basic human rights of all migrant workers,"'82 including those who
are not legal migrants, and to adopt all measures that are "necessary and appropriate"
to suppress the clandestine movement of workers and illegal employment of
migrants. States are required to provide sanctions against employers of illegal
immigrants, with the aim to prosecute those trafficking in labor.'
Part II of Convention No. 143 applies only to legal migrants and States Parties
are obligated to declare and pursue national policies to promote equality of treatment
between migrant workers and nationals pertaining to employment and occupation,
social security, cultural rights and trade union rights, and individual and collective
freedoms.18 4
E. The International Refugee Regime
Under the 1951 Convention'8 5 and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of
1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees,'8 6 a person officially referred to as
a "refugee" is one who has lost the protection of the government of his/her
nationality or permanent residence and has fled that state seeking refuge and
assistance in another country. The refugee must have fled the state due to
persecution or a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of "race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." Under
the system, individual claims are addressed for protection and the system is not
responsive to situations of mass influx. Those who have fled or attempted to flee
but who have not been allowed to leave or have not been able to leave the country
are generally referred to as "internally displaced persons." In light of the current
refugee crisis, this definition of a refugee is rather inadequate to meet the needs of
those fleeing war, famine, economic deprivation and natural disasters.
To fill the gap in the 1951 Convention's narrow definition of a refugee, regional
efforts took place in Africa and Latin America to widen the definition. In 1969, the
Organization of African Unity (now the African Union) adopted the Convention on
the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa.8 I It expanded the definition in
1949, 120 U.N.T.S. 71; International Labour Organization, supra note 174, at annex, art. 17.
181. ILO, Migrant Workers Recommendation, supra note 175.
182. Id at pt. 1, art. 1.
183. Id at pt. 1, art. 3.
184. Id at pt. 2, arts. 10-14.
185. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 150 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954).
186. U.N. General Assembly, Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606
U.N.T.S. 267, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3ae4.html.
187. Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, art. 1(2), 1000
U.N.T.S. 45, 8 I.L.M. 1288, Sept. 10, 1969 (entered into force June 20, 1974),
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36018.html.
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the Convention by accepting as refugees those who are compelled to flee because of
external aggression, occupation, foreign domination, or events seriously disturbing
public order. Subsequently, in 1984, ten Central American states adopted a similar
approach in the non-binding Cartagena Declaration,"' expanding the definition
further by adding flight from generalized violence, internal conflicts, and massive
violation of human rights.
VI. ANALYSIS
Despite several international and regional attempts to address the complex
challenges of migrants and refugees, the problem persists. And since 2014 it has
indeed worsened with rising xenophobia and anti-immigration violence in several
countries. The UN General Assembly declaration addressing the problem, the New
York Declaration, discussed above, brought the world's leaders together to explore
common ground aimed at protecting the rights of migrants and refugees. The
outcome, however, was mixed. While UNHCR officials considered the Declaration
a "game changer for refugee protection and for migrants"8 9 and "nothing short of a
miracle,"'" the fact remains that it was not legally binding and lacked tangible
outcomes.
As the first General Assembly declaration specifically on refugees and
migrants, it acknowledged the high level of human mobility and its magnitude and
complexity. This evidently shows that the world cares about refugees and migrants.
This expression, in itself, is laudable, as are the principles and commitments agreed
by world leaders and enshrined in it. These include: "We . . . will fully protect the
human rights of all refugees and migrants, regardless of status;"'9' and "We declare
our profound solidarity and support" for migrants and their families.192 The leaders
expressed their determination "to find long-term and sustainable solutions," 93 and
"to address the root causes of large movements of refugees and migrants, including
through increased efforts aimed at early prevention of crisis situations based on
preventive diplomacy." 94 The Declaration also contains specific provisions for the
protection of migrant women and children and for supporting countries affected by
migration.
However, this lofty rhetoric and these lofty principles notwithstanding, the
Declaration did not adequately and effectively address the enormous challenges the
188. 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, OAS / Ser. LIJV/1I.66, doe. 10, Rev. 1, 190-3
http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/51c801934.pdf.
189. UiN Summit seen as "game changer" for refugee and migrant protection, UNHCR (Sept. 6,
2016), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2016/9/57ceb07e4/un-summit-game-changer-refugee-
migrant-protection.html.
190. Volker Tirk, The New York Declaration: Once-in-a-lfetime opportunity to enhance refugee
protection, UNHCR (Oct. 12, 2016), http://www.unher.org/admin/dipstatements/57fe577b4/new-york-
declaration-once-lifetime-opportunity-enhance-refugee-protection.html.
191. N.Y. Declaration, supra note 4, at 5.
192. Id. at 8.
193. Id. at 10.
194. Id. at 12.
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world community faces with the current migration crisis. As the Declaration is a
voluntary and non-binding document, the commitments are not measurable, there is
no obligation to implement the commitments and there is no concrete plan of action.
But for the goal two years hence to develop a global compact on refugees,1'9 there
is and a global compact for "safe, orderly and regular migration" 96 there is no
timeline for action in the Declaration. Alexander Betts, the head of Oxford's
Refugee Studies Center, called the Declaration "thin on content and connections to
practice."'9 7
The Declaration also suffers from several gaps, such as excluding from its
agenda the challenge of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) - it simply mentions in
passing that there are more than 40 million IDPs 98 and notes that the needs of such
persons along with those of refugees and migrants are explicitly recognized in the
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.9 9 The Declaration also fails to include
the protection of vulnerable migrants and does not explicitly prohibit the detention
of children.
The Declaration fails to provide guidelines on protection for migrants in
vulnerable situations, offering instead just assistance, as it states:
We will consider developing non-binding guiding principles and voluntary
guidelines, consistent with international law, on the treatment of migrants in
vulnerable situations, especially unaccompanied and separated children who do not
qualify for international protection as refugees and who may need assistance.200
It is appropriate to ask why migrants who flee humanitarian crises, severe
violence, famine, gangs, would not receive protection, but only assistance. The
Member States should be considering developing principles and guidelines for their
actual protection and not merely assistance.
The Declaration also stops short of committing to end the immigration
detention of children. Although Member States said in the Declaration that they
would pursue alternatives to detention while the assessment of the migrants' legal
status, entry, and stay is being considered, the leaders added:
Furthermore, recognizing that detention for the purpose of determining
migration status is seldom, if ever, in the best interest of the child, we will use it only
as a measure of last resort, in the least restrictive setting, for the shortest possible
period of time, under conditions that respect their human rights and in a manner that
takes into account, as a primary consideration, the best interest of the child, and we
195. Id. at 21.
196. Id at annex 11(1).
197. Alexander Betts, UN. Refugee Summit: Abstract Discussions in the Face of a Deadly Crisis:
In the first of a two-part prelude to the U.N. summit, Alexander Betts, the head of Oxford's Refugee
Studies Centre, plots the flawed origins of a meeting some states celebrate having sabotaged, NEWS
DEEPLY (Sept. 12, 2016), https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/community/2016/09/12/u-n-refugee-
summit-abstract-discussions-in-the-face-of-a-deadly-crisis.
198. N.Y. Declaration, supra note 4, at 3.
199. Id. at 16.
200. Id. at 52.
328 VOL. 45:3
2017 MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES: WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD?
will work towards the ending of this practice.201
Notwithstanding all these qualifications, it bears repeating: detention is never
in the best interest of the child. As the Council on Community Pediatrics has stated,
The conditions in which children are detained [in the United States] and
the support services that are available to them are of great concern to
pediatricians and other advocates for children. In accordance with
internationally accepted rights of the child, immigrant and refugee
children should be treated with dignity and respect and should not be
exposed to conditions that may harm or traumatize them. The
Department of Homeland Security [DHS] facilities do not meet the basic
standards for the care of children in residential settings.202
The Council recommends: "DHS should discontinue the general use of family
detention and instead use community-based alternatives to detention for children
held in family units."203 Earlier, in June 2014, a Human Rights Watch researcher had
spoken at a hearing of the US House of Representatives Committee on Homeland
Security: "The US government's policy of detaining large numbers of children
harms kids and flouts international standards."2 4  She added, "Congress should be
exploring alternatives to detention that other countries facing spikes in border
crossings have used successfully."205
In the New York Declaration, Member States did commit to promoting
international cooperation on border control and management but noted that "[s]tates
are entitled to take measures to prevent irregular border crossings."2 03 6 This raises
the concern that states may feel empowered to resort to taking especially harsh
border control measures aimed at deterring migrants and refugees from entering.
That is exactly what has happened in many European countries which, when
Faced with an unprecedented flow of migrants into the continent, built fences and
used many deterrence measures and strict border controls to keep migrants from
entering. As for the European Union initiatives, it undertook the MPF initiative
mentioned above207 and further reformed the Common European Asylum System. 208
The MPF and the Malta Declaration reflect Europe's desire to control and secure its
borders, but this will likely be achieved at the cost of violating its obligations under
201. Id. at 33.
202. Julie M. Linton, et al., Detention of Immigrant Children, 139 PEDIATRICS 4, 1 (2017),
http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/pediatrics/early/2017/03/09/peds.2017-0483.full.pdf.
203. Id. at 8.
204. Clara Long, US: Surge in Detention of Child Migrants: Congress Should Protect, Not Punish,
Unaccompanied Children, HRW (June 25, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/06/25/us-surge-
detention-child-migrants.
205. Id. See also Frangois Cr6peau, Any detention of migrant children is a violation of their rights
and must end, THE CONVERSATION (co-published with UNICEF) (Sept. 7, 2016),
http://theconversation.com/any-detention-of-migrant-children-is-a-violation-of-their-rights-and-must-
end-64985.
206. N.Y. Declaration, supra note 4, at 24.
207. Migration Partnership Framework, supra text accompanying note 71.
208. See European Commission: Migration and Home Affairs, Common European Asylum System,
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum en (last updated Apr. 22, 2017).
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international law toward migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers, primarily the
obligation to protect their human rights.
Although the EU is providing development aid to partner countries, many
partner countries lack the wherewithal to fulfill their own obligations under the MPF,
because of weak government institutions and frail political situations; Libya is a
clear example. Thus, Europe will have to make substantial investments toward
capacity building and improving the living conditions in its partner countries to
ensure a significant reduction in migrant flows.209 As to the reform of the Common
European Asylum System, it has been aptly criticized as aimed at externalizing
protection and reinforcing the EU's policy of containing refugees outside the EU
through migration control and by sending asylum seekers to third states without
examining their protection claims.2 10
The Dublin mechanism has been often reformed but remains broken, as only
member states located at the external borders of the EU assume responsibility for
migrants entering Europe. Also, it does not take into account the asylum seekers'
preference. A November 2016 report by Human Rights Watch, entitled EUPolicies
Put Refugees at Risk,2 11 states that the European Commission's reform of the
Common European Asylum System is more informed by a logic of deterrence than
a commitment to basic human rights. Far from insuring the right to family
reunification, over the past year numerous EU countries have restricted the right to
bring family members to safety, and there is a discernible trend towards granting
subsidiary - temporary - protection over refugee status. Proposed changes to the
EU directives governing procedures, qualifications for asylum, and reception
conditions include some positive measures but also measures to punish asylum
seekers for moving from one EU country to another, obligatory use of "safe country"
and "internal flight alternative" concepts to deny protection, and compulsory
reviews to enable revoking refugee status and subsidiary protection.
2 12
The urgent need is to protect the fundamental human rights of migrants and
refugees during transit and within the receiving state's territory, without
discrimination. We find the current protection gap is created as a result of 1) crises
in the home country of migrants and refugees and 2) stringent border controls by
receiving states. An urgent reform on collective responsibility-sharing is essential
because currently there is no equitable distribution of responsibility; the global south
209. For critical comments, see Olivia Akumu, The EU's Ethical Dilemma: The scramble to stem
the refugee and migrant flow into Europe, MARTIN PLAUT WORDPRESs (Feb. 13, 2017),
https://martinplaut.wordpress.com/2017/02/27/the-eus-ethical-dilemma-the-scramble-to-stem-the-
refugee-and-migrant-flow/; Elizabeth Collett, New EU Partnerships in North Africa: Potential to
Backfire, MIGRATION POLICY (Feb. 2, 2017), www.migrationpolicy.org/news/new-eu-partnerships-
North-Africa-Potential-Backfire; Bob Van Dillen, The EU Agenda Behind the Migration Partnership
Framework, CARITAS (June 29, 2016), http://www.caritas.eu/news/the-eu-agenda-behind-the-migration-
partnership-framework.
210. Vincent Chetail, Looking Beyond the Rhetoric of the Refugee Crisis: The Failed Reform of the
Common European Asylum System, 5 EUR. J. HuM. RTS. 584, 587-88 (2016).
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carries a disproportionately large share. Similarly, an urgent need is to expand the
number of legal pathways for refugee admission and settlement in third countries
with access to jobs, as well as a prohibition on the detention of children and access
for children to education and preservation of family unity. Only then will the
smuggling of people stop.
Furthermore, humanitarian efforts and development must be linked. The
private sector, the World Bank, and the current initiative regarding the Sustainable
Development Goals and the 2030 Agenda,213 will be essential so that refugees can
become contributing members of society.
VII. CONCLUSION
The challenge indeed is formidable. A series of efforts has been ongoing for
over a decade to find a solution. But the goal of comprehensive and effective global
governance for migration through international cooperation has yet to be
achieved.214 In this state-centered international system, states are empowered to
decide who enters their territory and on what terms. Given that reality, what is
ultimately required is implementation of international human rights and labor
standards that protect migrants and refugees' human rights, which states have
already voluntarily accepted. However, what is in evidence is the states' efforts to
manage migration to serve their interests. This they do by connecting policies such
as those of deterrence, strict border controls, and meeting their labor needs. The two
global compacts - one each on refugees and migrants - must aim for a human rights-
based framework to inform the various provisions for inclusion in those compacts,
such as shared responsibility, finance, resettlement, and other matters related to
refugees' and migrants' protection.
We do not lack norms. But what is severely lacking is the political will to
translate these norms into concrete, operational outcomes.
213. While adopting the Sustainable Development Goals and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development, the World Leaders at the UN Summit stated: "We also recognize that international
migration is a multidimensional reality of major relevance for the development of countries of origin,
transit and destination, which requires coherent and comprehensive responses. ... Such cooperation
should also strengthen the resilience of communities hosting refugees, particularly in developing
countries." G.A. Res. 70/L. 1, Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,
at 29 (Sept. 25, 2015). Goal 8.8 states: "Protect labour rights and promote safe and secure working
environmental for all workers, including migrant workers, in particular women migrants, and those in
precarious employment." Id. at 8.8. Goal 10.c states: "By 2030, reduce to less than 3 per cent the
transaction costs of migrant remittances and eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher than 5
percent." Id. at 10.c.
214. See generally Inter-Parliamentary Union, Migration, Human Rights and Governance:
Handbook for Parliamentarians No. 24 (2015),
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/MigrationHRandGovernanceHRPUB1 5_3_EN.pd
f; see also Francois Crdpeau & Idil Atak, Global Migration Governance: Avoiding Commitments on
Human Rights Yet Tracing a Course for Cooperation, 34/2 NETH. Q. OF HUM. RTS. 113, 113-146 (2016).
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